

Guidance to SIRE 2.0 Key Points



Ref: 034

4.1.2 Operation and testing of radar/ARPA (Observed in Trial Inspection) / TMSA 5.1.2

4.1.2. Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for managing and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel, and were records available to demonstrate that the units had been operated and tested in accordance with company procedures?

Short Question Text

Operation and testing of radar/ARPA

Vessel Types


Oil, Chemical, LPG, LNG

ROVIQ Sequence

Bridge

Publications

ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition
IMO SOLAS



CORE

Inspection questions focused on preventing/mitigating risks that could directly lead to a catastrophic risk event.



Hardware



Binary



Process



Graduated



Human



Graduated

Objective

Please refer "Bridge Procedures Guide" for more information. This can be purchased here, [Bridge Procedures Guide, Sixth Edition](#)

To ensure that the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel are used effectively for navigation and collision avoidance.



Following Positive Observation was issued in trial inspection.

Procedures and documentation noted to be above expectations (equinor).
Exceeded normal expectation. OOW demonstrated confident ability in his duties.
Found effectively communicating knowledge and responsive to inspection process (Shell).



Potential Grounds for a Negative Observation

- There were no company procedures for managing and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.
- The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for managing and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.
- The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the hazards of using AIS data (vectors) for collision avoidance.
- The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the difference between the performance characteristics of X-band (9 GHz) and S-band (3 GHz) radars.
- The radar/ARPA units had not been in operation in accordance with company procedures.
- The radar/ARPA units had not been tested in accordance with company procedures.
- The radar/ARPA units were defective in any respect.
- The heading, speed or positional feeds to the radar/ARPA units were inaccurate when compared to the master devices.
- There was no indication of the scanner blind sectors affecting the radar coverage for each radar unit.
- The radar magnetrons had not been changed in accordance with the planned maintenance schedule.



Process



Human



Process



Hardware



Process